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SAVING DISGORGEMENT FROM ITSELF: SEC
ENFORCEMENT AFTER KOKESH v. SEC
PATRICK L. BUTLER†
ABSTRACT
Disgorgement is under threat. In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme
Court held that disgorgement—a routine remedy that allows the SEC
to recoup ill-gotten gains from financial wrongdoers—is subject to a 5year statute of limitations because it functions as a “penalty.” This
ruling threatens to upend the traditional conception of disgorgement as
an ancillary remedy granted by the court’s equity power, because there
are no penalties at equity. With the possibility that Kokesh’s penalty
reasoning could be adopted beyond the statute of limitations context,
the future of disgorgement in federal court is in doubt.
This Note proposes a way forward that allows for disgorgement’s
continued viability. The SEC should moderate its use of disgorgement
for three reasons: because of a trend of suspicion toward strong
government enforcement power by the Supreme Court, because it has
been improperly used punitively, and because the rise of other statutory
schemes has displaced disgorgement’s original justification. At the
same time, disgorgement should be saved because of the uncertain
future of administrative disgorgement proceedings, the intuitive notion
of recovering money from wrongdoers, and the much-needed ability to
compensate victims. To save disgorgement, the SEC should limit its use
only to restoring the status quo of injured investors, thereby ensuring a
remedial—not penal—purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1987 film Wall Street, Gordon Gekko famously proclaims:
“Greed, for lack of a better word, is good.”1 Even before Gekko
captured the sentiment of an era, the world of stocks, bonds, and
trading floors had seized the American public imagination.2 Yet
American popular culture seemed to be uniquely defined by corporate
excess during the 1980s,3 from gaudy fashion4 to chillingly satirical
portrayals in literature.5
However, if the 1980s appeared to be a boom time for bankers
culturally, the ensuing decades proved to be a real-world reckoning.
The name “Enron” has been seared into social consciousness as a
metonym for scandalous financial fraud since 1997.6 The dot-com
bubble burst in 2000, devastating the industry.7 More recently, the 2008
financial crisis, “the Great Recession,” plunged the American
economy into its most precarious position since the Great Depression.8
And public approval of the financial industry hit a forty-year low in

1. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
2. See HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTELBY, THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET
(Dodo Press 2006) (1853) (detailing a Wall Street lawyer’s interactions with his downtrodden and
depressed clerk).
3. See William Taylor, Crime? Greed? Big Ideas? What Were the ‘80s About?, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 32–33 (noting how depictions of corporate greed pervaded the popular
imagination of Americans in the 1980s).
4. See Trend Alert: 1980s Banker’s Shirt, CLOTHES CAPTIONED (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.clothes-captioned.com/trend-alert-1980s-bankers-shirt
[https://perma.cc/LLB6AP9A] (noting and illustrating the fashion revival of the banker shirt and its contrast collars that
imply the excess associated with the 1980s).
5. See generally BRET EASTON ELLIS, AMERICAN PSYCHO (1991) (offering a vivid
description of the life and times of a psychopathic stockbroker in Manhattan during the 1980s).
6. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) (providing a narrative
description of how the infamous Enron financial scandal occurred).
7. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND
ITS UNDOING (2004) (attempting to trace the origins of the stock market’s rapid rise and
calamitous fall in the 1990s).
8. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE
(2011) (narrating the buildup and crash of the American housing bubble in 2008).
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2011.9 Even nearly ten years after the start of the recession, railing
against Wall Street remains an effective political move.10
Set against this backdrop, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) has proven to be one of the most vigorous tamers
of Wall Street excess. As a protector of the public interest in the world
of securities, the SEC has been a highly active enforcement body, filing
754 enforcement actions in 2017.11 But after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kokesh v. SEC,12 the SEC may have lost one of its most
powerful tools for addressing financial misconduct—disgorgement.
Disgorgement is “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits
illegally obtained) on demand or by legal compulsion.”13 For the SEC,
this tactic—implemented through a request to the courts—has become
an indispensable part of its enforcement toolbox. In the 2017 fiscal year
alone, disgorgement accounted for $2.9 billion of the over $3.7 billion
that the SEC obtained through its administrative proceedings and
court judgments.14
The remedy’s roots can be traced back to the 1971 landmark
decision SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,15 the first instance in which a
court authorized disgorgement.16 Federal courts had previously limited
the SEC largely to the relief authorized by the Securities Act of 193317

9. See Lindsay A. Owens, 40-year Low in America’s View of Wall Street, CNN (Oct. 7, 2011,
9:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/07/opinion/owens-wall-street-disapproval/index.html
[https://www.perma.cc/5K6Y-D3G4] (“Animosity toward Wall Street is at its highest level in at
least 40 years.”).
10. See David Weigel, Not Much Unites Democrats and Republicans. Anger at Wall Street
Does., WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/not-much-unitesdemocrats-and-republicans-anger-at-wall-street-does/2016/01/18/265998e8-bdf0-11e5-83d442e3bceea902_story.html?utm_term=.f7aa6f7f62a4 [https://www.perma.cc/UF7C-M927] (“Eight
years after the start of the Great Recession, and seven years since the Troubled Asset Relief
Program was implemented, the anger at major financial institutions has only grown—in both
parties.”).
11. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK
BACK AT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 6 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW9L-56YH] [hereinafter SEC 2017 ENFORCEMENT REPORT].
12. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
13. Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. SEC 2017 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
15. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
16. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote Three Notwithstanding: The Future of the
Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases, 56 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 20 (2018) (“There is general
agreement that the penalty phase of Texas Gulf Sulphur was the first time a court determined
that the SEC had authority to seek disgorgement of a defendant’s ill-gotten gains.” (citations
omitted)).
17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
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and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;18 that is, the SEC had to rely
on “an injunction barring future violations of securities laws.”19
Changing that paradigm, Texas Gulf Sulphur invoked the court’s
equity power to grant disgorgement as ancillary to the primary relief of
an injunction: “[T]he SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in
order to effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of
1934], so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty
assessment.”20 Disgorgement was thus established by the courts as a
remedial measure supplemental to an injunction, created explicitly in
order to “effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of
1934].”21
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Securities Enforcement Remedies
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 199022 and section 308 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 200223 have combined to provide the SEC with the ability
to seek disgorgement through administrative proceedings.24 When
sought administratively, disgorgement is granted according to a
statutory imprimatur. However, when the SEC seeks disgorgement in
federal court, it is ordered through the court’s equity power.
Accordingly, disgorgement sought by the SEC in federal court exists as
purely a judicial creation, legitimized by the Second Circuit in 1971.
Equitable disgorgement has been largely unchallenged since its
conception.25 Recently, however, the Supreme Court suddenly cast the
future of the remedy into doubt when it held in Kokesh that
disgorgement operates as a penalty for the purposes of statute of
limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2462,26 which requires that
proceedings to initiate certain penalties be “commenced within five
years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . .”27 But the general

18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 78a–78qq.
19. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017).
20. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308.
21. Id.
22. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246).
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See James Tyler Kirk, Deranged Disgorgement, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 131,
134 (2014) (“Today, the legitimacy of disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions is
unchallenged.”).
26. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1646 (2017).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
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rule is that “there are no penalties in equity.”28 Kokesh thus raises a
pressing question: Can disgorgement continue to be granted through
the equity power of the courts?
If the Kokesh reasoning is adopted beyond the context of the
statute of limitations, the answer would be simple: disgorgement
cannot be granted by the court’s equity power. But, given the lack of
statutory authorization for equitable disgorgement, its invalidation
would deprive the SEC of a vitally important enforcement tool.
Although administrative disgorgement is statutorily authorized, that
enforcement mechanism may also be in danger, albeit for different
reasons.29 This Note largely addresses the future of equitable
disgorgement in federal court, where the SEC brings its most complex
cases.30
In light of the threats currently facing disgorgement, this Note
proposes a new framework to ensure disgorgement’s continued
viability. Because Kokesh evinced a concern about the remedy’s abuse,
it is through moderation that the future of disgorgement can be
ensured. Echoing the warning posed by Kokesh, this Note argues that
there are three principal reasons why the SEC should rein in its use of
equitable disgorgement. First, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has
trended toward rejecting unbridled government enforcement power,
like that historically shown by the SEC in disgorgement. Second,
essentially punitive uses of disgorgement by the SEC have contravened
equity principles. Third, the original rationale for disgorgement—the
successful enforcement of federal securities laws—is no longer as
persuasive given the advent of other statutory schemes and new
enforcement mechanisms.
That said, equitable disgorgement is worth saving for several
reasons: it cannot be entirely effectively replaced by administrative
disgorgement, it embodies the intuitive notion that wrongdoers should
28. Samuel Bray, Equity at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/10/equity-at-the-supremecourt/?utm_term=.19e10df3a48f [https://www.perma.cc/6RMN-EHWU].
29. See Jonathan H. Adler, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Unconstitutional?,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
28,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/12/28/are-the-secs-administrative-law-judges-unconstitutional/?utm_term=
.04e7b3977397 [https://perma.cc/XF2S-2X4D] (discussing the uncertain future of SEC’s
Administrative Law Judges under the Appointments Clause); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
30. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [https://perma.cc/
YF7Y-669U] (“[M]ost of its complicated insider-trading cases have been heard in federal court,
not by its in-house judges.”).
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not profit from their wrongdoing, and it fulfills the vital need to
compensate victims. The SEC should narrow its use of disgorgement
so that it restores the pre-wrongdoing status quo and compensates
defrauded investors—nothing more. In this way, disgorgement would
return to its remedial roots while abandoning its use as a deterrent, and
thereby no longer act as a penalty under Kokesh’s reasoning.
Ultimately, the SEC should limit disgorgement in order to save
disgorgement.
Part I provides a concise background on the history of the SEC
and its enforcement power and on the development of ancillary
equitable remedies. Part II specifically examines disgorgement’s
origins and its historical development. Part III analyzes Kokesh v. SEC.
Part IV presents the reasons for scaling back disgorgement, while also
arguing that disgorgement, ultimately, is worth saving. And finally,
Part V offers solutions that would save disgorgement from itself.
I. BACKGROUND ON SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The SEC is empowered by a broad mandate to serve as the
principal civil enforcement body for the securities laws. As the SEC
fulfills this public mission, its ancillary equitable powers, including
disgorgement, play a pivotal role.
A. The Role and Power of the SEC
Composed of twenty-three offices and five divisions,31 the SEC
claims a comprehensive mission to “protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”32 The
SEC describes the period of its origin as “an era that was ripe for
reform,”33 framing its roots in conformity with its broad duty. The
Great Stock Market Crash of 1929 provided the impetus for massive
renovation of the regulatory framework. That crisis sparked the
passage of two laws that fundamentally transformed how securities
were regulated in the United States—the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.34 The Securities Exchange Act of

31. What We Do, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/8YR5-CUT4].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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1934 formally created the Securities and Exchange Commission.35
According to the SEC, there are “two common-sense notions” that
underlie the motivation for its founding legislation: “Companies
publicly offering securities for investment dollars must tell the public
the truth about their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the
risks involved in investing,” and “[p]eople who sell and trade
securities—brokers, dealers, and exchanges—must treat investors
fairly and honestly, putting investors’ interests first.”36
A critical part of the SEC’s mission is “interpret[ing] and
enforc[ing] federal securities laws.”37 Specifically, the SEC’s
enforcement efforts—investigating and litigating violations—are
undertaken by the Division of Enforcement, created in 1972.38 Once a
violation has been found, the SEC can pursue enforcement through the
federal courts, administrative proceedings, or both. The SEC can also
simultaneously refer a violation to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution.39 In federal courts, the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, often interpreted together,
provide the statutory authorization for the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement to enforce these laws:
Whenever it shall appear to the [Securities Exchange] Commission
that any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices
constituting a violation of any provisions of this chapter, the rules or
regulations thereunder . . . [the Commission] may in its discretion
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the
United States courts of any territory or other place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or
restraining order shall be granted without bond.40

35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012) (“There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange
Commission . . . to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
36. What We Do, supra note 31.
37. Id.
38. About the Division of Enforcement, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 2, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html [https://perma.cc/8QQJ-EXQ5].
39. See generally Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative
Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 215 (1980) (detailing the development of the
different methods of enforcement that the SEC may pursue).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012); see also id. § 77v (providing for jurisdiction over “offenses
and violations” of, as well as “suits in equity and actions at law brought under,” the Securities Act
of 1933).
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Taken together, these two statutes form the basis for the principal
statutorily authorized relief sought in federal court by the SEC—the
injunctive action.41 In addition, section 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provides that federal courts possess “exclusive jurisdiction
. . . of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.”42
B. Ancillary Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions
Equity jurisdiction allows courts to invoke their equity power,
which “includes all power necessary to make effective the decree
rendered by the court.”43 Broadly, equity can be defined as “a set of
rights, remedies, and procedures available ostensibly to ameliorate
defects of the common law (such as in the cases of fraud, mistake, and
forgery) and to enforce equitable instruments that required the
ongoing supervision of a court (such as trusts and guardianships).”44
Equity occupies a unique position within the American legal system,
largely emptied of its historical legal force while still maintaining a
certain relevance.
Equity’s lineage can be traced to the dual-track English legal
system; common law courts and equity courts simply had different
jurisdictions.45 Importantly, in English courts, equity courts only
possessed jurisdiction when legal, “common law” courts did not.46 As
with many other aspects of English common law, the nascent American
legal system adopted a similar conception of equity. Equity is
enshrined not only within Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution (“in
Law and Equity”),47 but also in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity”).48 However, a preference for
common law is apparent in the Constitution. The Seventh Amendment
41. See id. § 78u(d).
42. Id. § 78aa(a).
43. Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188,
1189 (1975).
44. Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and JudgeMade Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 266 (2010).
45. See id. (“In eighteenth century England, equity was available in separate courts with
equity powers but was not available in the law courts. As a doctrinal matter, a court of equity had
jurisdiction only when no remedy was available in law, or when the available legal remedy was
incomplete or inadequate.”).
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
48. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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guarantees a jury trial at common law, and it “prohibits a federal court
from hearing a case in equity when the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law.”49 The English preference thus became the American
preference. Accordingly, equitable remedies exist only where common
law remedies do not, or cannot, provide full relief.
In the SEC enforcement context, the equity power of the court
broadens the scope of permissible relief beyond mere injunctions.
Equity allows courts to grant other ancillary equitable remedies, most
notably disgorgement—a principal remedy arising out of the Securities
Acts.50 That is, equity is invoked to further the enforcement of the Acts
where legal remedies are not enough.
The equitable relief granted by a court can take many different
forms, including “injunction, specific performance, reformation . . . ,
accounting for profits, constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation,
. . . equitable rescission,”51 and, of course, disgorgement.52 Ancillary
remedies are “simply means and instruments by which primary rights
may be more efficiently preserved, protected, and enforced in judicial
proceedings.”53 Equitable remedies become ancillary equitable
remedies when they are “aiding or subsidiary and supplemental to
some principal relief to make the principal relief effective.”54 Viewed
through a securities enforcement lens, ancillary equitable remedies are
intended to add to or supplement the principal relief of an injunction
barring future violations of securities laws.55
Ancillary equitable relief, like disgorgement, has long been held
permissible under the 1933 Securities and 1934 Securities Exchange
Acts. In Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC,56 the
Ninth Circuit articulated this principle when it stated, in reference to
the Acts:
49. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 233 (2018) (citing
Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 110 (1891); Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 271, 278 (1857); Parsons
v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)).
50. See Comment, supra note 43, at 1188–89 (“The power of the courts to grant SEC requests
for relief beyond a simple injunction against further wrongdoing appears well-established.”).
51. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 541–42
(2016).
52. See infra Part II.
53. 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 171 (4th ed.
1918).
54. George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal
Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 867 (1983).
55. See infra Part II.A.
56. L.A. Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
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[A]s the Supreme Court has stated with respect to other regulatory
statutes, . . . the Congress must be taken to have acted cognizant of
the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of
statutory purposes. As the Supreme Court long ago recognized, there
is inherent in the courts of equity a jurisdiction to give effect to the
policy of the legislature.57

Building upon the broad historical power of equity, courts have
thus granted forms of ancillary relief that serve to effectuate the larger
consumer protection and preventative purposes of the 1933 Securities
Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act.58 Accordingly, within the
securities enforcement context, the courts may invoke—and the SEC
may seek—the power of equity to fashion ancillary relief in three main
ways: “(a) the remedying of past abuses through the grant of monetary
relief; (b) the prevention of future fraud by requiring the adoption of
special corporate procedures; and (c) the temporary appointment of
special agents in cases of gross mismanagement requiring unusual
control or wholesale replacement of existing management.”59
These three principal categories demonstrate the wide variety of
equitable relief that the SEC can pursue ancillary to its injunction.
Within the first category, disgorgement60 and rescission61 are examples
of remedial monetary relief. The second category includes a company’s
establishment of special committees or implementation of specific
preventative policies as set out by the SEC.62 And the third category
involves the appointment of special agent-receivers who function as
“officer[s] of the court who stand[] neutral among all parties and whose
primary function is the protection of the property within [their] control
from waste or mismanagement.”63 Moreover, the court may order
independent directors to manage the company in accordance with SEC

57. Id. at 182.
58. See Dent, supra note 54, at 867 (“The SEC and some commentators have found
justification for [courts granting] ancillary relief in the need to effectuate the purposes of the
securities laws . . . .”).
59. Comment, supra note 43, at 1188 (citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971) (requiring
the restitution of profits derived from insider trading).
61. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2d Cir. 1973)
(recognizing that the SEC “may institute an action for injunctive relief [including restitution]”
(citing SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103–04 (2d Cir. 1972)); Tex. Gulf
Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1309 (“[T]he district court had the power to order the cancellation of the
option so as to effect the purpose of the [Securities Exchange] Act.”).
62. See Comment, supra note 43, at 1196.
63. Id. at 1200.
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discretion,64 or the court may even appoint special counsel with
oversight and investigatory power.65 In sum, the SEC has the ability to
request a wide array of specific forms of ancillary equitable relief to
further the statutory scheme aimed at securities fraud prevention.66
II. DISGORGEMENT IN THE SEC ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT
This Part describes the history, purpose, and operation of
disgorgement. Part II.A reviews disgorgement’s foundations in the
landmark Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. Part II.B details the history of
disgorgement as a remedial and deterrent tool. Part II.C explains the
procedural requirements of disgorgement. Finally, Part II.D explains
the SEC’s use of administrative disgorgement.
A. The Origins of Disgorgement
Disgorgement serves as an ancillary equitable remedy granted by
the court in response to violations of federal securities laws. In some
instances, disgorgement or an analogous remedy is expressly permitted
by statute. The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 provides for disgorgement through SEC
administrative proceedings,67 while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 allow for
clawbacks of executive compensation after financial misconduct.68
However, no statutory authorization for equitable disgorgement in
federal court exists.69 Disgorgement, like any other ancillary equitable
remedy, is thus granted in accordance with a court’s equity power, to
further the enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.70
Texas Gulf Sulphur established the modern framework for grants
of disgorgement as an ancillary equitable remedy. That case marked

64. Id. at 1204.
65. Id. at 1208.
66. See Dent, supra note 54, at 867 (“The SEC and some commentators have found
justification for ancillary relief in the need to effectuate the purposes of the securities laws and in
the general equity powers of the federal courts, particularly as reflected in precedents involving
other administrative agencies.”)
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–2(e) (2012).
68. Id. §§ 7243(a) (Sarbanes-Oxley), 78j–4(b) (Dodd-Frank).
69. See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 2 (2013) (“Congress has never explicitly included disgorgement among the remedies
the SEC can seek in federal court.”).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a) (Securities Act); 78u(d)(5) (Securities Exchange Act).
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the first time that disgorgement was pursued by, and granted to, the
SEC as relief for violations for federal securities laws.71 In Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the Second Circuit held that “the SEC may seek [remedies]
other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the
Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty
assessment.”72 This holding set forth two important principles: first,
that disgorgement is within the ancillary equitable powers conferred
upon the court, and second, that disgorgement cannot serve as a
penalty.73
The first principle can be seen in the Second Circuit’s embrace of
disgorgement as necessary to fully realize a key aim of the Securities
Acts—the protection of consumers from future wrongdoing.74 That is,
the court considered disgorgement as an equitable ancillary to the
primary relief of an injunction, implicitly asserting that the court must
move beyond merely granting an injunction in order to fully effectuate
consumer protection. The Texas Gulf Sulphur court reasoned by
analogy: Just as corporate receivers can be appointed under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 without statutory authorization,
equitable disgorgement of ill-gotten gains should be allowed as well.75
Texas Gulf Sulphur also cited as rationale Supreme Court decisions
granting equitable relief pursuant to other, unrelated statutory
schemes,76 such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,77 the Housing
and Rent Act of 1947,78 and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.79
Taking an expansive view of its own power, the court stated that it

71. Ryan, supra note 69, at 3 n.13 (“The SEC first sought and obtained disgorgement in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.”).
72. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
73. Id.
74. See supra Part II.B.
75. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307.
76. Id.
77. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 337 (1960) (holding that “a District
Court has jurisdiction to order an employer to reimburse employees, unlawfully discharged or
otherwise discriminated against, for wages lost because of that discharge or discrimination” in
enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, c. 676, § 15(a)(3), 52 Stat.
1060, 1068 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)).
78. United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 620 (1951) (holding that restitution for rent
overcharges was permissible under the Housing and Rent Act (citing Housing and Rent Act of
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-129, ch. 163, § 206(b), 61 Stat. 193, 199–200)).
79. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (holding that it is within a court’s
equitable powers to order restitution for rent overcharges under the Emergency Price Control
Standards Act of 1942 (citing Emergency Price Control Standards Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77420, ch.26, § 205(e), 56 Stat. 23, 34)).
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could not “infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose
to circumscribe the courts’ power to grant appropriate remedies.”80 In
other words, according to the Texas Gulf Sulphur court, restricting its
capacity to grant disgorgement would compromise one of the court’s
most important roles—crafting appropriate relief.
Texas Gulf Sulphur also set out a second principle of
disgorgement—it must be remedial rather than penal.81 In rejecting
arguments from the defendants that disgorgement operates as a
penalty,82 the court embraced the view that disgorgement is remedial.
Although it did not use the specific term “disgorgement,” the court
declared that the relief granted was not penal in nature because
“[r]estitution of the profits on these transactions merely deprives the
appellants of the gains of their wrongful conduct.”83 For the Texas Gulf
Sulphur court, restoring the status quo after a violation of securities
laws constituted remedial relief, not a punitive measure, and the status
quo was restored by seizing ill-gotten gains from wrongdoers.
Accordingly, after Texas Gulf Sulphur, disgorgement was considered
to be both within the equity power of the court and remedial in
nature.84
B. Historical Principles of Disgorgement: Remedial and Deterrent
Purposes
Although the Kokesh Court deemed disgorgement to be penal in
nature for the purposes of statutes of limitations,85 courts historically
embraced it as remedial after Texas Gulf Sulphur. For example, the
court in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,86 delineated the outer
boundaries of remedial relief. That case involved a fraudulent public
offering of common stock by the defendants.87 Although the lower
court allowed the SEC to obtain disgorgement of both the proceeds
and the profits from the fraudulent stock offering, the Second Circuit

80. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308 (quoting Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 391 (1970)).
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308.
83. Id.; see Ryan, supra note 69, at 3 n.14 (noting that courts in the 1970s and 1980s often
referred disgorgement as restitution, a similar equitable remedy).
84. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 3 (“Over time, courts came to accept as a truism the notion
that disgorgement is inherently an ancillary equitable remedy.” (citations omitted)).
85. See supra Part I.
86. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
87. Id. at 1094.
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disagreed, explaining that “ordering the disgorging of profits and
income earned on the proceeds is in fact a penalty assessment.”88
The Manor Nursing court reasoned that the disgorgement at issue
was not remedial because “defendants in private litigation would not
be required to pay defrauded purchasers the profits on the proceeds.”89
Rather, public investors bringing suit would only receive the difference
between what they paid and the value of what they received.90 The
court held that “the [district] court erred in ordering appellants to
transfer to the trustee all the profits and income earned on such
proceeds.”91 That is, the Manor Nursing court considered disgorgement
remedial only when it took the exact amount the investors paid the
wrongdoer, and the court considered disgorgement penal when it took
anything more—including any money the wrongdoer earned because
of those initial, illicitly gained investments. Manor Nursing accordingly
represents an instance where a court ensured that disgorgement
adhered to its remedial roots by not allowing repayment beyond the
actual amount of ill-gotten gains directly tied to the defendant’s fraud.
Another example of the courts’ embrace of disgorgement as a
remedial measure is SEC v. Penn Central Co.92 In that case, the issue
was whether an SEC disgorgement action was rendered punitive by the
existence of a parallel private suit to recover damages against securities
law violators.93 The defendants argued that paying damages to
defrauded investors and surrendering the same ill-gotten gains to the
SEC would be duplicative, and thus a penalty.94 The court rejected that
reasoning, holding instead that the existence of simultaneous SEC and
private suits “does not make the relief sought any less remedial.”95 The
court further reinforced the nonpunitive nature of disgorgement by
explaining that “[p]rivate suits do not necessarily restore the status
quo,” and thus SEC actions for disgorgement can work to complete the
recovery of ill-gotten gains.96 To mitigate any punitive duplicative
effect, the court held that any amount of damages paid in a parallel

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Id. at 596, 599.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
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private suit would reduce the disgorgement amount.97 For the Penn
Central court, disgorgement exists to ensure “total recovery from the
wrongdoer,”98 and not to impose a penalty.
Although not expressly stated in Texas Gulf Sulphur,99 deterrence
was a central principle of disgorgement doctrine in the years before
Kokesh. For example, Manor Nursing declared that “[t]he deterrent
effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly undermined if
securities law violators were not required to disgorge illicit
profits.”100 Moreover, according to Manor Nursing, the statutory
scheme mandates that the courts and the SEC ensure that security
fraud violations do not profit wrongdoers.101 Penn Central echoed this
principle, declaring that disgorgement “serves to protect the investing
public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.”102
Another example is SEC v. Golconda,103 wherein the court rejected an
argument that an injunction provides enough of a deterrent. The court
stated that not granting disgorgement “would impair the full impact of
the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement of the
Securities Acts is to be achieved.”104 The court in SEC v. First Jersey
Sec., Inc.,105 went so far as to declare that deterrence is “the primary
purpose of disgorgement as a remedy for federal securities laws
violation.”106 And finally, the SEC itself embraced the deterrent
function of disgorgement in a 2006 report, stating that “the aim of
disgorgement is to deprive defendants of their ill-gotten gains in order
to deter future violations.”107

97. See id. (“To the extent that defendants have made restitution, the amounts paid would
serve to offset part or all of a judgment for disgorgement. In the event that we deem disgorgement
appropriate, defendants will have the opportunity to prove that they have already relinquished
their ill-gotten gains.”).
98. Id.
99. See supra Part III.A.
100. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. See id. (“The effective enforcement of federal securities laws requires that the SEC be
able to make violations unprofitable.”).
102. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. at 599.
103. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
104. Id. at 259.
105. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
106. Id. at 1475.
107. U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE
SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 19 (2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
sox308creport.pdf [https://perma.cc/95F7-7JBK] [hereinafter 2006 SEC SECTION 308(C)
REPORT].
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C. The Mechanism for Determining Disgorgement
Federal courts have developed a series of procedural rules for
granting disgorgement. First, although the SEC usually requests
disgorgement, it is the district court that ultimately determines the final
amount.108 Second, disgorgement is limited to funds that are “causally
related to the wrongdoing.”109 Courts cannot reach profits that were
obtained through legal means.110 Third, the amount of disgorgement
sought by the SEC, and thus granted by the district court, “need only
be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the
violation.”111 Fourth, the SEC bears the burden of showing that the
amount it requested resembles a “reasonable approximation.”112 Once
the SEC meets that initial burden, the burden then shifts to the
defendants to prove that the amount is instead unreasonable.113 This
burden is a weighty one for defendants because courts often err on the
side of granting a larger amount in disgorgement: “[T]he risk of
uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created
that uncertainty.”114 Ultimately, the district court enjoys “wide latitude
in [disgorgement] matters.”115
Once disgorgement has been ordered, the district court must
determine how the recouped money is to be distributed.116 Typically,
the district court orders the defendant to pay the disgorged amount
into an escrow account overseen by a receiver or trust that “is given the
task of locating those members of the public who were injured by the
illegal activity and . . . [the task of] pay[ing] each injured party an
amount determined by the trustee to be fair and equitable.”117 The
district court then reviews the disgorgement plan set out by the
108. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The remedy consists of
factfinding by a district court to determine the amount of money acquired through wrongdoing—
a process sometimes called ‘accounting’—and an order compelling the wrongdoer to pay that
amount plus interest to the court.”).
109. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1232.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1995).
116. See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Once the profits have
been disgorged, it remains within the court’s discretion to determine how and to whom the money
will be distributed, and the district court’s distribution plan will not be disturbed on appeal unless
that discretion has been abused.” (citations omitted)).
117. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1404 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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administrator according to the “fair and reasonable” standard.118
Notably, disgorgement plans can be ordered regardless of the presence
of injured investors.119 And the disgorged amount can be transferred
directly to the U.S. Department of the Treasury in cases where it is
“not feasible” to find the injured investors.120 Although the exact
amount of disgorged funds paid to the Treasury is uncertain, in 2017
the SEC transferred $1.9 billion in both disgorgement and civil
penalties to the Treasury.121 Overall, the district court has broad equity
power over disgorgement, determining when it can be granted, how
much can be recouped, and to whom the ill-gotten gains will be
returned.
D. Forum Choice and the SEC: Federal Court or Administrative
Action
The SEC can pursue enforcement of the securities laws through
two main avenues: federal court or administrative action.
Disgorgement doctrine has been developed by the SEC principally in
federal court, as demonstrated by the Texas Gulf Sulphur line of
cases.122 But the SEC may also utilize administrative action to serve its
public mission. The SEC’s power to obtain disgorgement
administratively was granted by a litany of reform bills intended to
prevent financial misconduct.123 Accordingly, the SEC is often
presented with the pivotal choice of which forum is best suited for its
needs and goals.
118. See SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (“With the fair and reasonable standard
firmly in mind, we must examine the district court’s approval of the Revised Plan to see if its
decision constituted an abuse of discretion.”).
119. See Fischbach, 133 F.3d at 175–76 (noting that “the primary purpose of disgorgement is
to deter violations of the securities laws” and that “the measure of disgorgement need not be tied
to the losses suffered by defrauded investors”).
120. For example, Lund noted:
Any amount remaining in the escrow account [holding funds for the compensation of
members of the public harmed by Lund’s conduct] after one year shall be paid into the
United States Treasury. If the magistrate determines that it is not feasible to locate
those members of the public who were harmed by Lund’s conduct, he may order the
escrow funds to be paid into the United States Treasury at an earlier time.
Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1405; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2017 AGENCY
FINAL REPORT 31 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-agency-financial-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F673-VBB3] (“Disgorgement and penalties ordered and collected from violators of the
securities laws, some of which are then returned to harmed investors and the balances are
transferred to the Treasury”).
121. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 120, at 69.
122. See supra notes 74–90 and accompanying text.
123. See id.
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The SEC’s forum selection calculus has undergone significant
change in recent years. Throughout most of securities enforcement
history, the dichotomy was that “litigated cases involving registered
entities such as broker-dealers and investment advisers were generally
brought in administrative proceedings, while cases involving nonindustry individuals and entities were brought in federal district
court.”124 While the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 marked
a new stage in the growth of the SEC administrative forum, the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010125 was the high-water mark of
the SEC’s embrace of agency adjudication. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform Act of 2010 enables the SEC to pursue enforcement
actions against individuals and nonregistered entities in administrative
proceedings, and not just in federal court.126 This newfound power has
been used frequently: “In 2014, for example, the SEC instituted more
than 610 administrative proceedings—nearly double the number of
administrative actions filed in 2005.”127 And this discretion is almost
entirely the SEC’s to wield.128

124. Randall J. Fons, Administrative Proceedings vs. Federal Court: The SEC Provides
Limited Transparency into Its Choice of Forum, MONDAQ (May 13, 2015),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/396864/Securities/Administrative+Proceedings+Vs+Fed
eral+Court+The+SEC+Provides+Limited+Transparency+Into+Its+Choice+Of+Forum
[https://perma.cc/G6U9-YBFV].
125. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g)(1) (“In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a),
the Commission may impose a civil penalty on a person . . . .”); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE. J. REG. 1, 9
(2017) (“After Dodd-Frank, the SEC no longer needs to proceed in federal court in order to
assess civil penalties.”).
127. William R. Baker, III, Brian E. Kowalski, Kory S. Wilmot & Stephen P. Barry, SEC
Enforcement Division Issues Guidance on Venue Selection, LATHAM & WATKINS 1 (2015),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-sec-guidance-choice-of-venue [https://perma.cc.6R45WDGN].
128. See Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-in-seccases.html [https://perma.cc/BE3E-VGQ7] (“The S.E.C. has almost unfettered discretion to
choose where a case will be litigated, much to the chagrin of defense lawyers who complain that
an administrative adjudication deprives their clients of valuable rights.”).
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Due to negative media coverage and outcry from the white-collar
defense bar,129 the SEC published its own internal guidelines for forum
selection in 2015.130 The publication lists four factors:
The availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of
relief in each forum; . . . [w]hether any charged party is a registered
entity or an individual associated with a registered entity . . . the cost-,
resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each forum[;] . . . [and
f]air, consistent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and
matters.131

Despite SEC’s public-image conscious response, the SEC still
possesses the power of the final forum choice.132 This choice might be
somewhat constrained by a public perception of a “home-court
advantage” and by constitutional challenges to the administrative
forum, but the choice remains with the SEC. Ultimately, however, after
Kokesh v. SEC, disgorgement remains under threat.
III. KOKESH V. SEC: MR. KOKESH GOES TO WASHINGTON
As the owner of two firms, Charles Kokesh advised business
development companies on investments.133 The SEC alleged that he
misappropriated $34.9 million between 1995 and 2009 and that he filed
false and misleading reports to conceal the misappropriation.134 In the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, Kokesh was found
guilty of violating a litany of federal securities laws.135 The court
ordered Kokesh to pay $2,354,593 as a civil monetary penalty.136 With
respect to the civil penalty, all malfeasance committed by Kokesh prior
to October 27, 2004, was excluded from the calculation of the total
129. See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 30 (noting fairness concerns over the SEC’s
administrative proceedings from defendants, members the securities bar, and a former SEC
judge); Henning, supra note 128 (noting that defense lawyers complain that the SEC
administrative adjudication “deprives their clients of valuable rights”).
130. Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, U.S. SECS.
& EXCH. COMM’N (2015), https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/
FCPAReview/FCPAReviewSummer2015_SEC-Guidance_Division-of-Enforcement-Approachto-Forum-Selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U5H-3LTG].
131. Id. at 1–4.
132. Fons, supra note 124 (“The guidance, however, ultimately provides the Division with
virtually complete discretion in choosing the playing field that will be most advantageous to its
case and to its view of the ‘proper development of the law.’”).
133. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1642.
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penalty because of the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. §
2462.137 Unsurprisingly, the SEC also sought disgorgement to the fullest
measure—a total of $34.9 million that included $29.9 million for
misconduct before October 27, 2004.138 The district court ruled that the
five-year statute of limitations under § 2462 did not apply to the
disgorgement amount because disgorgement is not a penalty.139 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that disgorgement is
neither a penalty nor a forfeiture.140 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine the status of disgorgement under § 2462.141
At first glance, the Kokesh decision seems routine and limited in
scope. The Supreme Court, in a 9–0 opinion, held that disgorgement is
subject to the five-year statute of limitations because the SEC’s use of
disgorgement is a penalty for the limited purposes of § 2462.142 That is,
disgorgement is a penalty and not remedial, but only within one statute.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sotomayor relied upon the
Huntington v. Attrill143 definition of a penalty: a “penalty” is a
“punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by
the State, for a crime or offense against its laws.”144 Justice Sotomayor
also outlined two principal requirements for an action to be a
penalty.145 First, the act must seek to redress a public wrong.146 And
second, deterrence—not compensation—must be the principal
purpose of the action.147
Disgorgement easily fulfilled the two-part penalty test according
to the Court in Kokesh. The Court reasoned that because violations of
securities laws are public law offenses against the United States,148 the
subsequent removal of illicit profits from wrongdoers serves to redress
a public wrong.149 The SEC had previously conceded the first
137. Id. at 1641 (“As to the civil monetary penalties, the District Court determined that §
2462’s 5-year limitations period precluded any penalties for misappropriation occurring prior to
October 27, 2004—that is, five years prior to the date the Commission filed the complaint.”).
138. Id. at 1640.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1645.
143. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
144. Id. at 667.
145. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1643.
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Huntington penalty factor by acknowledging its role of acting in the
public interest.150 According to the Court, the public nature of SEC
disgorgement is shown in the fact that the SEC may continue an
enforcement action without any injured individuals as parties.151
The Court also found that SEC disgorgement meets the second
Huntington characteristic of penal measures.152 Relying on lower-court
interpretations, the Court characterized disgorgement primarily as a
tool to prevent future financial misconduct.153 Despite the fact that
victims many times do receive disgorged funds,154 the Court found it
dispositive that district courts are not statutorily commanded to
distribute funds to victims.155 Justice Sotomayor concluded her opinion
by declaring that “SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a
penalty.”156
As with many Supreme Court decisions, the devil of Kokesh is in
the footnotes. Footnote 3 states, in full:
Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied
disgorgement principles in this context[.] The sole question presented
in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement
actions, is subject to § 2462’s limitations period.157

In one footnote, the Supreme Court seemingly opened up
Pandora’s box. As one commentator on the decision notes, “when the
Supreme Court says, ‘We’re not expressing an opinion on x,’ you can
be pretty sure the justices are expressing an opinion on x.”158 The New
York Times published an article entitled Supreme Court Casts Doubts

150. Id. (remarking that the SEC embraced its public enforcement role in its briefs).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1644 (“Some disgorged funds are paid to victims; other funds are dispersed to
the United States Treasury.” (citations omitted)).
155. See id. (“Even though district courts may distribute the funds to the victims, they have
not identified any statutory command that they do so. When an individual is made to pay a
noncompensatory sanction to the Government as a consequence of a legal violation, the payment
operates as a penalty.”).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1642.
158. Bray, supra note 28.
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on a Potent S.E.C. Weapon.159 A Forbes piece even went so far as to
herald a world without disgorgement, in Chronicle of Disgorgement’s
Death Foretold: Kokesh v. SEC.160 The Cato Institute, a libertarian
think tank, also took notice, issuing a Shakespearean blog title: Kokesh
v. SEC: A Penalty by Any Other Name.161 Kokesh also unleashed a
torrent of examination pieces on law firm websites, having prompted a
quiet cheer throughout the immensely profitable and highly active
white-collar defense bar.162
For the first time since 1971, disgorgement appears vulnerable.163
The SEC has pushed disgorgement to its equitable limit, recovering
from defendants amounts that were essentially penal—amounts that
went beyond merely restoring the status quo. For example, the SEC
sought disgorgement in cases where the defendants never received the
profit of their misconduct,164 and sought the full amount where the
defendant’s expenses reduced the illegal profit in question.165 The
reasoning of Kokesh, despite attempts to cabin its holding, nonetheless
opens the door for a wider decision that deems disgorgement a penalty
as a categorical matter. If disgorgement were held categorically to be a
penalty, it could no longer be authorized by a court in equity, and
federal courts would need statutory authorization to grant it. Put
simply, Footnote 3 of Kokesh resonates because it lays bare the uneasy

159. Peter J. Henning, Supreme Court Casts Doubt on a Potent S.E.C. Weapon, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/dealbook/supreme-court-castsdoubts-on-a-potent-sec-weapon.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://www.perma.cc/D969-DT3T].
160. Robert Anello, Chronicle of Disgorgement’s Death Foretold: Kokesh v. SEC, FORBES
(July 11, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/07/11/chronicle-ofdisgorgements-death-foretold-kokesh-v-sec/#284bfc6861b8 [https://perma.cc/H6WX-79XF].
161. Thaya Brook Knight & Ilya Shapiro, Kokesh v. SEC: A Penalty by Any Other Name,
CATO INST. (June 6, 2017, 8:55 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/kokesh-v-sec-penalty-any-othername [https://perma.cc/AP7S-EU6S].
162. See, e.g., Nicolas Bourtin, Nicole Friedlander, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sharon L. Nelles,
Kenneth M. Raisler, Karen Patton Seymour, Samuel W. Seymour, Benjamin R. Walker &
Alexander J. Willscher, Kokesh v. SEC: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That a Five-Year Statute of
Limitations Applies When the SEC Seeks Disgorgement in Enforcement Actions, SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL (June 6, 2017), https://www.sullcrom.com/kokesh-v-sec-us-supreme-court-holdsthat-a-five-year-statute-of-limitations-applies-when-the-sec-seeks-disgorgement-inenforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/9B5C-K3M9] (noting the beneficial effects of the Kokesh
ruling for defendants).
163. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
164. See generally SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding an inside trader
liable for the gains of those to whom the illicit information was given).
165. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017) (“SEC disgorgement sometimes is
ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the amount of illegal
profit.”).
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doctrinal ground for disgorgement. Just as federal court disgorgement
was granted by judicial authority, it may also be taken away by judicial
authority.166
IV. DISGORGEMENT’S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
As suggested by the Supreme Court in Kokesh, disgorgement has
undoubtedly been pushed to the limits of its power by the SEC. This
Part argues that there are three principal reasons why disgorgement is
under threat, and thus why it should be reined in. First, recent Supreme
Court cases repudiate unbridled governmental enforcement authority.
Second, disgorgement has been erroneously utilized as a penalty at
equity. And third, the original rationale for equitable disgorgement—
filling a crucial gap in the SEC enforcement arsenal—does not have the
same force in the present day. By limiting its use of disgorgement, the
SEC can save disgorgement in federal court. Equitable disgorgement
should be saved for a number of reasons, including the uncertain future
of disgorgement in administrative proceedings, the intuitive notion
that wrongdoers should not profit from their wrongs, and the need to
compensate defrauded investors.
A. Why Disgorgement Should Be Reined In
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Trends Against Expansive
Enforcement Power. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has moved
toward rejecting the type of unchecked governmental power that the
expansive use of disgorgement represents. This judicial trend is best
seen through the lens of cases like Kokesh,167 Gabelli v. SEC,168 and
Honeycutt v. United States.169 In each of these cases, and in others, the
Court has curbed the government’s ability to exercise its enforcement
power seemingly without any meaningful limit. Taken together, these
cases serve as a warning for the SEC that if it continues to push the
limits of disgorgement, it may suffer the most significant setback of its
enforcement powers to date—the complete loss of equitable
disgorgement.
166. See generally e.g., Francesco A. DeLuca, Sheathing Restitution’s Dagger Under the
Securities Acts: Why Federal Courts are Powerless to Order Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement
Proceedings, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 899 (2014) (arguing that disgorgement is not truly an
equitable remedy and thus should not be granted by the court).
167. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635.
168. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013).
169. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017).
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Kokesh itself demonstrates the Supreme Court’s reluctance to
continue endorsing the unchecked enforcement power held by the
SEC. Specifically, the Court’s holding that disgorgement is subject to a
five-year statute of limitations170 offers a procedural restraint that had
not bound the SEC before. No longer can the government reach deep
into the past to disgorge amounts from securities violations committed
long ago. For the SEC, this limitation was significant; in the Kokesh
case, it meant the difference between receiving a non-time-barred
recovery amount of $39.9 million or the five-year statutorily limited
amount of $5 million.171 Accordingly, Kokesh marks an instance in
which the Court provided a meaningful limit on SEC enforcement
power by holding the Commission to a procedural restraint.
Gabelli is another case in which the Supreme Court circumscribed
the enforcement power of the SEC by holding that the five-year statute
of limitations for civil penalties under § 2462 begins when the fraud
occurs, not when the SEC discovers it.172 The SEC had sought to have
the five-year statute of limitations for civil monetary penalties begin
when the Commission discovers the wrongdoing,173 which would
strengthen the SEC’s already significant enforcement abilities. For
example, if the Court had ruled that the statute of limitations
commences upon the discovery of fraud, the SEC could prosecute a
violation from the 1990s—or perhaps even further back—if it only
found out about the fraud in the present day. The Court rejected this
interpretation and noted that the SEC has several potent tools at its
disposal to promptly uncover wrongdoing, including demands for
detailed trading information,174 compelled disclosure of trading
books,175 subpoena power,176 authorization to pay whistleblowers,177
and ability to offer “cooperation agreements” to alleged wrongdoers.178

170. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1646.
171. Id. at 1641.
172. Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 454.
173. Id. at 449.
174. See id. at 451 (“It can demand that securities brokers and dealers submit detailed trading
information.”).
175. See id. (“It can require investment advisers to turn over their comprehensive books and
records at any time.”).
176. See id. (“And even without filing suit, it can subpoena any documents and witnesses it
deems relevant or material to an investigation.”).
177. See id. (“The SEC is also authorized to pay monetary awards to whistleblowers, who
provide information relating to violations of the securities laws.”).
178. See id. (“In addition, the SEC may offer ‘cooperation agreements’ to violators to procure
information about others in exchange for more lenient treatment.”).
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In fact, the Court declared that “the SEC as enforcer is a far cry from
the defrauded victim the discovery rule evolved to protect.”179 The
Court’s ruling demonstrated that allowing the SEC to enjoy the
benefits of the statute of limitations discovery rule would be a step too
far in terms of permitting unbridled enforcement authority.
Although it did not involve securities fraud, Honeycutt also serves
as an example of the Supreme Court reining in unbridled government
enforcement power.180 In Honeycutt, the Court held that joint and
several liability does not apply to the criminal asset forfeiture statute,
21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1).181 Tony Honeycutt pled guilty to several federal
drug crimes for distributing iodine—a product used in
methamphetamine production—through the hardware store he
owned.182 As part of his guilty plea, Tony was ordered to pay $200,000
of the $269,751.98 he had received in illicit profits.183 Terry Honeycutt,
Tony’s brother, was indicted as a co-conspirator, and the Government
sought to use the Criminal Asset Forfeiture Act of 1984 to recoup the
remaining $69,751.98 of profit from Terry.184 This Act allows the
government to pursue “any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of”
the crimes in question.185 The government used a theory of joint and
several liability to force Terry—who had been indicted as a coconspirator but who notably neither owned the store nor saw any of
Tony’s profits—to pay the remaining illicit profits.186

179. Id.
180. See Dixie L. Johnson, Carmen Lawrence, M. Alexander Koch, Matthew H. Baughman
and Abraham N.M. Shashy, Jr., King & Spalding Discusses Potential Effects of
SEC Disgorgement As a Penalty, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21,
2017) http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/06/21/king-spalding-discusses-potential-effects-ofsec-disgorgement-as-penalty/#_edn25 [https://perma.cc/YWH2-MZWR] (arguing that Kokesh
and Honeycutt “signal a clear desire by the Court to rein in the government’s more aggressive
theories of monetary remedies”).
181. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1628 (2017).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Section 853(a)(1)–(2) provides:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States,
irrespective of any provision of State law—(1) any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such
violation; (2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation . . . .
21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (2012).
186. Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1628.
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Rejecting the application of joint and several liability in this
instance, the Court held that permissible forfeitures are limited to what
the defendant himself acquired as a result of his crime, not what his coconspirator acquired.187 In simple terms, Terry Honeycutt was not
responsible for forfeiting profits that his brother Tony made because
Terry had “no ownership interest in his brother’s store and did not
personally benefit from the illegal sales.”188 Honeycutt held that the
text of the statute limits forfeiture to tainted property that a defendant
personally procured,189 noting that joint liability runs counter to other
forfeiture statutes and is not reflected in congressional intent.190
Honeycutt is troubling for the SEC’s use of disgorgement because
it demonstrates that the Court’s recent limits on discretionary
governmental power have been extended beyond the securities
enforcement context. The drug crime context of Honeycutt illustrates
a much broader Supreme Court repudiation of the government using
its power without any meaningful limit. Specifically, the Court stated
that forcing Terry Honeycutt to forfeit profits that his brother Tony
made would constitute an “end run” of the Criminal Asset Forfeiture
Statute.191 According to Honeycutt, Congress explicitly “contemplated
situations where the tainted property itself would fall outside the
Government’s reach.”192 Therefore, in attempting to hold Terry
Honeycutt liable for gains he never received, the Government was
exercising its power beyond its statutory bounds. The Court rejected
the Government’s attempt to “circumvent Congress’ carefully
constructed statutory scheme . . . .”193 The Honeycutt decision marks a
concerted effort by the Court to tame excessive governmental power,
demonstrating that the force of its disapproval of expansive
enforcement power is not limited to the realm of securities.
2. SEC Use of Disgorgement as a Penalty Violates Notions of
Equity. Disgorgement should also be reined in because the SEC has
violated the principles of equity by using disgorgement punitively.
Kokesh defines disgorgement as a type of “restitution measured by the

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 1628–29.
Id. at 1633.
Id. at 1633–34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendant’s wrongful gain.”194 The Supreme Court, however, noted
several instances where the amount recovered by the SEC “exceed[ed]
the profits gained as a result of the violation.”195 In these cases,
disgorgement transforms from a remedial measure into a punitive
sanction. First, to demonstrate overzealous disgorgement in insider
trading cases, Kokesh disapprovingly cited SEC v. Contorinis196 that
SEC had been able to recover third-party profits from an insider trader
who never actually received such profits.197 Next, the Court made an
example of SEC v. Warde,198 wherein the SEC received disgorgement
from a tipper (the person who illegally released confidential
information that affects stock price), even though the disgorged gains
had been the tippees’ (the people who received the confidential
information).199 Both examples show that the SEC has used
disgorgement to penalize the wrongdoer for misconduct, as the
amounts recovered exceeded the restoration of the status quo and were
not limited to solely the amount gained by the wrongdoer. In using
disgorgement punitively, the SEC has been contravening basic equity
principles, as “there are no penalties at equity.”200
3. The Original Rationale for Disgorgement Is No Longer As
Persuasive. Disgorgement should also be narrowed because the SEC’s
enforcement power has expanded significantly since Texas Gulf
Sulphur. When first instituted, disgorgement fulfilled a reasonable
need: “to effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of
1934].”201 Previously, the SEC had the limited remedy of an injunction
at its disposal in order to deter wrongdoing,202 as well as other, less
potent ancillary equitable remedies.203 Disgorgement thus served a
unique purpose at the time as the only remedy in the SEC arsenal that
allowed the Commission to recoup profits from wrongdoers.204

194. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
195. Id. at 1644.
196. SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014).
197. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644.
198. SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1998).
199. Id. at 47.
200. Bray, supra note 28.
201. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
202. See supra Part III.A.
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. See supra Part I.
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Since the advent of disgorgement, the SEC has only increased in
power. It has notably received a number of other enforcement tools
that enable it to fully enforce the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. For example, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 allowed for the imposition of civil monetary
penalties—calculated according to the gross pecuniary gain of the
wrongdoing205—in federal court for violations of federal securities
laws.206 The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 also gave expansive power to the SEC’s
Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”), and thus “created the modern
regime of administrative proceedings.”207 These ALJs were not only
given cease-and-desist authority,208 but also the ability to
administratively order disgorgement with the same effect and
requirements as federal courts.209
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 expanded the SEC’s powers even
further, giving the Commission the statutorily authorized ability to
compensate injured investors with the money received through civil
penalties or disgorgement via a “Fair Fund.”210 And most recently, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 enabled the SEC to
administratively impose civil penalties outside of federal court.211 In
administrative proceedings, civil monetary penalties are not imposed
according to the defendant’s gain, as in disgorgement, but instead are
calculated according to “each act or omission” in violation of the
Securities Acts,212 with three tiers of penalty amounts increasing in
severity.213
205. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (2012).
206. See, e.g., id. § 78ff(c)(1)(B) (“Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section
78dd–1 of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action
brought by the Commission.”).
207. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV., 1155, 1164 (2016).
208. Section 77h-1(a) provides:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any person is
violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this subchapter, or any
rule or regulation thereunder, the Commission may publish its findings and enter an
order requiring such person, and any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of
the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would
contribute to such violation, to cease and desist from committing or causing such
violation and any future violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a).
209. Id. § 78u-2(e).
210. Id. § 7246.
211. Id. § 929(a).
212. Id. § 78u-2(b)(1).
213. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(g), 78u-2(b), 80a-9(d), 80b-3(i).
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At the time of Texas Gulf Sulphur, disgorgement as an equitable
remedy was necessary because it was the only way for the SEC to
recover illicit profits from wrongdoers and to fully enforce federal
securities laws.214 But since then, the arrival of a “panoply of
enforcement tools”215 has significantly lessened—but not necessarily
eliminated—the SEC’s need for disgorgement in federal court.
B. Reasons To Keep Disgorgement as an Enforcement Tool
The persuasive case for limiting the SEC’s excessive use of
disgorgement in federal court does not mean that disgorgement should
be abandoned entirely. Rather, there are three compelling reasons that
disgorgement as an equitable remedy should remain a powerful tool in
the SEC’s enforcement array. First, the SEC cannot move all of its
disgorgement actions to administrative proceedings because the future
of ALJs remains in doubt. Second, disgorgement satisfies intuitive
notions of justice by ensuring that ill-gotten gains are returned and
greed is not rewarded. And third, disgorgement by the SEC serves a
vital need—compensation for defrauded investors.
On its face, moving disgorgement to administrative proceedings is
a feasible response to the threat Kokesh poses for disgorgement in
federal court. After all, as former SEC enforcement director Andrew
Ceresney has noted, the SEC may “obtain many—though not all—of
the same remedies in administrative proceedings as [it] could get in
district court.”216 It would also track well with the larger trend of the
SEC’s embrace of the administrative proceeding: “Before 2010, the
agency initiated less than 400 administrative claims per year; after 2010,
it initiated substantially more than 400; in 2014, it brought 610, a
record.”217 And the SEC is resoundingly successful when it brings
administrative actions; the SEC has a success rate of 90 percent in front
of ALJs as opposed to 69 percent in federal court.218
However, ALJs—the very actors who would administratively
order disgorgement—are on shaky footing as well. In Lucia v. SEC, the
Supreme Court recently invalidated civil-service appointment of
214. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017).
215. Id. (noting that before Texas Gulf Sulphur there was an “absence of statutory
authorization for monetary remedies”).
216. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Secs. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enf’t, Remarks to the American
Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297 [https://perma.cc/JES7-P95V].
217. Zaring, supra note 207, at 1174.
218. Eaglesham, supra note 30.
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ALJs.219 Because the ALJs were appointed by the civil-service staff and
not by the Commission itself, and because the ALJs are officers of the
United States and not merely employees of the SEC, the Court ruled
that such appointments violate the Appointments Clause.220
Although the SEC recently moved to ratify its ALJs in accordance
with the Appointments Clause ruling in Lucia,221 a significant question
looms regarding the circumstances enabling the removal of ALJs.222
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, addressed this “embedded constitutional
question” of “the statutory ‘for cause’ removal protections that
Congress provided for administrative law judges.”223 Breyer, in doing
so, draws upon another recent case, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which struck down multilevel
protections for members of the Board.224 Specifically, Breyer focused
on an important ramification of the Lucia decision for the
administrative state as a whole: “If the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s
holding applies equally to the administrative law judges—and I stress
the ‘if’—then to hold that the administrative law judges are ‘Officers of
219. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (holding that SEC ALJs are “[o]fficers of the
United States” and must therefore be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution).
220. See id. at 2052–55 (concluding on the basis of the test set out in Freytag v. Comm’r, 501
U.S. 868 (1991), that the ALJs are not employees but “officers” for the purposes of the
Appointments Clause). The Appointments Clause states:
[A]nd [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
221. Order, Securities Act Release No. 10440, Exchange Act Release No. 82,178, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. 4816, Investment Company Act Release No. 32,929, 2017 WL 5969234
(Nov. 30, 2017); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Ratifies Appointment
of Admin. Law Judges (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-215
[https://perma.cc/SET4-SWSN].
222. This constitutional challenge of the ALJ regime has been discussed on SCOTUSblog:
That gets us to the second and more significant question that this decision has
produced: Can the extensive statutory protections against ALJ removal except for
good cause, which must be determined by the independent Merit System Protection
Board, survive, or will the court follow through on what it started in 2010 in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and strike down these
limits on removal?
Alan Morrison, Symposium: Lucia v. SEC – more questions than answers, SCOTUSBLOG (June
22, 2018 8:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-lucia-v-sec-more-questionsthan-answers [https://perma.cc/EV5A-57NG].
223. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2057 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010).
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the United States’ is, perhaps, to hold that their removal protections
are unconstitutional.”225 Accordingly, given the recent doctrinal
upheaval as a result of Lucia, heavily leaning on an imperiled remedy
(disgorgement) in an unstable forum (administrative proceedings) only
compounds the risk that the SEC will lose valuable enforcement
options.
Further, disgorgement should be saved because it is an intuitive
tool for the SEC, and perhaps more importantly, it is fundamentally
compatible with the larger purpose of the Securities Acts. The
reasonableness of the principle that wrongdoers should not stand to
profit from their ill-gotten gains is evidenced by the similarity of
disgorgement to another well-established equitable remedy—
restitution. Disgorgement and restitution share many of the same
concepts in the securities enforcement context, operating as equitable
remedies that take funds away from the wrongdoer.226 The SEC defines
restitution as “the repayment by a defendant of funds, or their
equivalent, to an injured person.”227 Moreover, in SEC enforcement
actions, “[r]estitution is intended to make investors whole.”228 In effect,
limiting disgorgement so that it only compensates investors makes the
relief function as restitution. The key difference between the two is one
of rationale; the purpose of restitution is to make investors whole,
while the purpose of disgorgement is to return the wrongdoer to his or
her status quo from before the misconduct. For all the reasons that
restitution has historically been embraced, disgorgement should also
remain a viable equitable remedy.
The justification for disgorgement—that wrongdoers should be
ordered to return ill-gotten gains to restore the status quo—also
underlies other SEC enforcement measures. For example, a clawback
provision in section 304(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 enables
the SEC to recover a certain amount of executive officer compensation
when the company restates its financials out of “material noncompliance” resulting from financial misconduct.229 A proposed

225. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2060 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226. See 2006 SEC SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 107, at 2–3 (“Disgorgement is a wellestablished, equitable remedy applied by federal district courts and is designed to deprive
defendants of ‘ill-gotten gains.’”).
227. Id. at 3 n.2.
228. Id.
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012) (“If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting
restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any
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addition to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 contains
a provision that would expand the use of clawbacks.230 Ultimately, the
general orienting principle of disgorgement is validated by the fact that
the same principle also supports restitution and other SEC
enforcement measures. Disgorgement is not an isolated enforcement
doctrine, but rather an embodiment of the familiar notion that
wrongdoers should not profit from their gains.
Disgorgement is also necessary because it fulfills an essential
role—compensating defrauded investors when they otherwise would
not be. In her study, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence
from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, scholar Urska Velikonja
declares that “[t]he rise of public compensation, such as the SEC’s
distribution funds, fills a void in securities laws that leaves many victims
with no private remedy.”231 Although some critique SEC enforcement
actions as duplicative of private litigation like securities class actions,232
Velikonja’s study reveals the opposite: “Successful class actions
accompany 46.3% of fair funds distributions overall and 28.1% of
distributions in cases not associated with issuer reporting and disclosure
violations.”233 Because the majority of cases are not accompanied by
successful class actions, “the SEC’s fair fund distribution is often the
only source of compensation for defrauded investors.”234 Between 2002
and 2012, the SEC created 243 fair funds through the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, and those funds distributed $14.46 billion in civil monetary
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief
financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer.”).
230. A law firm client release explains how this amended clawback provision would operate:
Under Dodd-Frank, the policy would apply in the event the company had to prepare
an accounting restatement due to the company’s material noncompliance with any
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws. The policy must provide that
the company will recover from any current or former executive officer an amount of
incentive-based compensation (including options awarded as compensation) equal to
the excess, if any, of the amount that was paid to the executive officer, in the three years
preceding the date on which the company was required to prepare the restatement,
over the amount that would have been paid to the executive officer based on the
accurate financial data.
Cydney Posner, SEC Proposes Clawback Rules, COOLEY (July 1, 2015),
https://cooleypubco.com/2015/07/01/sec-proposes-clawback-rules
[https://perma.cc/TMD2CNMC].
231. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence From the SEC’s Fair
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 331 (2015).
232. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on
the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 139–40 (2011) (arguing that securities class actions and SEC
enforcement actions achieve the same goal).
233. Velikonja, supra note 231, at 391.
234. Id.
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penalties and disgorgement to defrauded investors.235 Moreover,
between 2004 and 2012, an estimated 75 percent of the amount the SEC
received from enforcement actions was distributed through fair funds
to defrauded investors.236 These numbers represent a shockingly
successful compensation scheme, especially considering that
“traditional compensation schemes, in particular private litigation, fail
to compensate victims for large classes of harms.”237
V. SAVING DISGORGEMENT FROM ITSELF
While equitable disgorgement is under threat as currently
implemented, it can still be saved if the SEC tailors its use in two
primary ways. First, the SEC should limit disgorgement to amounts
that restore the pre-wrongdoing status quo, instead of pursuing
disgorgement beyond the amount the wrongdoer gained. Second, the
SEC should distribute the funds obtained through disgorgement not to
the U.S. Treasury or its own coffers, but rather to defrauded investors
as much-needed compensation. By adopting both of these self-imposed
reform measures, the SEC can ensure the continued vitality of
disgorgement in light of Kokesh and other threats.
Limiting the use of disgorgement to the profit the defendant
actually received is the first step in preserving disgorgement as a useful
SEC enforcement measure.238 The SEC should only request
disgorgement from the district court in cases where the “ill-gotten gains
remain extant and identifiable,”239 providing “a specific pool of money
that can be turned over to the SEC.”240 In these instances, there is a
concrete measure of the defendant’s wrongful gain, and disgorging that
amount would restore the pre-wrongdoing status quo.
To effectuate this new direction, the SEC should prevent the
dissipation of ill-gotten funds, using methods such as a “temporary
restraining order, a preliminary asset freeze, the appointment of a

235. Id. at 333.
236. Id. at 334 n.12.
237. Id. at 338.
238. See Johnson et al., supra note 180 (noting that “the Commission could define
disgorgement more narrowly as restitution to the victims of the illegal conduct, in keeping with
the original holding of Texas Gulf Sulphur and therefore more in line with the traditional
equitable powers of federal courts”); see also discussion supra Part IV.B. (regarding the difference
between restitution and disgorgement).
239. Ryan, supra note 69, at 11.
240. Id.
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receiver, [or] a voluntary agreement.”241 This would be a simple rule
for the SEC to follow, but it would nonetheless significantly curtail the
SEC’s enforcement power.242 As stated previously, the SEC does have
a bevy of other enforcement tools—for example, civil monetary
penalties and criminal sanctions—to mitigate this reduction in
authority.243 Although curtailing the expansive scope of its
disgorgement power could frustrate the SEC’s remediation of certain
complex frauds, that is better than the alternative of losing
disgorgement altogether.
In restraining disgorgement so that it only restores the status quo
that existed prior to the wrongdoing, the SEC would thus avoid a
central rationale of the Kokesh Court’s penalty reasoning—that the
SEC’s use of disgorgement “sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a
result of the violation.”244 Thus, disgorgement would be used solely as
a remedial measure, and not a punitive one. As stated previously, there
are numerous instances in which the SEC has recouped more from the
wrongdoer than the profits he or she actually received; recall the
insider trader forced to pay for the benefit gained by third parties in
Contorinis,245 the tipper ordered to give up profits obtained by the
tippees in Warde,246 and the wrongdoer-incurred expenses that were
not deducted from disgorged ill-gotten gains as in Kokesh.247 In these
cases, the SEC pressed disgorgement as far as it could, but it is evident
that the Supreme Court considers such tactics to be penalties, not
remedial measures. To prevent disgorgement from fulfilling a

241. Id.
242. See id. (“[T]hese cases [where ill-gotten gains are extant and identifiable], based on the
author’s two decades of anecdotal experience on both sides of SEC enforcement cases, represent
a small fraction of SEC disgorgement cases.”).
243. See supra Part IV.A.4.
244. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
245. See SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]n insider trader may be
ordered to disgorge not only the unlawful gains that accrue to the wrongdoer directly, but also
the benefit that accrues to third parties whose gains can be attributed to the wrongdoer’s
conduct.”). But see supra note 197 and accompanying text (noting that Kokesh cites Contorinis
disapprovingly to warn against overzealous disgorgement).
246. See SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven if the [tippee’s] profits were
fairly characterized as third party profits, Warde would nevertheless be liable to disgorge their
profits. A tippee’s gains are attributable to the tipper, regardless whether benefit accrues to the
tipper.”). But see supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (noting that Kokesh cites Warde
disapprovingly).
247. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644 (“As demonstrated by this case, SEC disgorgement
sometimes is ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the amount
of illegal profit.”).
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significant part of the Kokesh penalty rationale, the SEC should limit
its requests to the amount of profits actually gained as a result of the
wrongdoer’s violation. That is, disgorgement should be used only to
restore the status quo.
The SEC should also reorient its use of disgorgement so that it is
solely a compensatory measure for defrauded investors. In fact, the
SEC already employs its enforcement powers to receive compensation
for affected victims of securities fraud through the Fair Funds provision
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Section 308 of that Act “gives the
SEC a more prominent role in compensating defrauded investors.”248
This section states:
If in any judicial or administrative action . . . the Commission obtains
a civil penalty against any person for a violation of such laws, or such
person agrees, in settlement of any such action, to such civil penalty,
the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the
direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of a
disgorgement fund . . . for the benefit of the victims of such
violation.249

The establishment of fair funds to compensate defrauded investors
shows that the SEC already has a mechanism for funneling
disgorgement proceeds directly to victims.250 The SEC’s self-imposed
dedication of disgorgement proceeds to victim compensation alone
would thus not require a new statutory framework, but a renewed
commitment to an existing one. Moreover, these fair funds are
effective. Between 2002 and 2012, the SEC created 243 fair funds that
distributed $14.46 billion in civil monetary penalties and disgorgement
amounts to defrauded investors.251 Rather than treating section 308 fair
funds victim compensation as optional, the SEC should treat it as a
mandate that limits the Commission to seeking disgorgement only in
instances where defrauded investors can be compensated.
The SEC’s use of disgorgement solely as a compensatory measure
would thereby ensure that the tool does not fulfill the second prong of
the Kokesh penalty reasoning—a use to deter rather than to

248. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS.
LAW. 317, 318 (2008).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012) (quoted in Black, supra note 248, at 326).
250. See Black, supra note 248, at 326 (“[T]he statute confers upon the SEC the authority to
include the civil penalty, along with the disgorgement amount, in a Fair Fund for distribution to
the victims of the violation.”).
251. Velikonja, supra note 231, at 333.
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remediate.252 Specifically, Kokesh held that pecuniary measures
become penal when requested “for the purpose of punishment, and to
deter others from offending in like manner.”253 As identified in Kokesh,
many previous cases expressly treated disgorgement as a deterrent
measure. For example, Kokesh cited SEC v. Fischbach254 for the
proposition that the “primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to
deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their illgotten gains.”255 In addition, the Court quoted SEC v. Rind256: “The
deterrent effect of [an SEC] enforcement action would be greatly
undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge
illicit profits.”257 However, it is evident that deterrence is simply not a
permissible justification for disgorgement after Kokesh because
“[s]anctions imposed for the purpose of deterring infractions of public
laws are inherently punitive.”258 By seeking disgorgement for the
express purpose of compensating defrauded victims, the SEC could
transform the tool from a penal sanction to an entirely remedial action.
In that sense, SEC disgorgement would no longer be a deterrent under
the Kokesh penalty test, helping to prevent the complete loss of
disgorgement.
Although the SEC’s self-restraint in crafting disgorgement policy
could save the tool, this strategy certainly has drawbacks. Some posit
that the SEC should not become “a collection agency for defrauded
investors” because “effective enforcement policy is not necessarily
compatible with a dominant emphasis on recovering and returning
funds to investors.”259 A potential concern of such a preemptive
narrowing of the SEC disgorgement power may be that it allows
defendants to retain ill-gotten gains in cases where no defrauded
investors can be identified. At the larger doctrinal level, the concern
over whether the SEC should serve as a collection vehicle for
defrauded investors is mitigated by the fact that its ability to
compensate serves a vital purpose: “More often than not, the SEC

252. See Johnson et al., supra note 180 (suggesting that “[r]enaming the remedy to clarify that
it is different from the ‘SEC disgorgement’ analyzed by the Court, and removing it from
deterrence rhetoric, could help clarify that [disgorgement] is remedial, not a penalty.”).
253. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017).
254. SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1997).
255. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643 (quoting Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 175).
256. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
257. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643 (quoting Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491).
258. Id.
259. Black, supra note 248, at 345.
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compensates harmed investors for losses where a private lawsuit is
either unavailable or impractical.”260 For those who worry that some
wrongdoers will go unscathed in cases where their victims go
unidentified, the SEC—irrespective of disgorgement—still possesses
the ability to “ask federal courts, when imposing statutory penalties
against a defendant, to calculate that penalty as an amount equal to the
‘gross amount of pecuniary gain to [the] defendant as a result of the
violation.’”261
However, the existence of civil monetary penalties calculated
according to the amount of ill-gotten gains raises another question:
Why does the SEC not just use statutorily enacted civil monetary
penalties to recover these illicit profits? The answer is simple: It is
easier for the SEC to collect disgorgement proceeds than civil penalty
proceeds because penalties are subject to the Federal Debt Collection
Procedures Act (“FDCPA”),262 which erects significant procedural
hurdles for the SEC to overcome when seeking to collect defendant
profits.263 In contrast, both administrative and court-ordered
disgorgement, as the direct result of district court orders, are subject to
only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.264 This makes disgorgement
proceeds easier to obtain because the SEC can seek collection through
a number of options, most significantly through civil contempt
proceedings, which are prohibited under the FDCPA.265 In spite of
these counterarguments, restraining the use of disgorgement to the
260. Velikonja, supra note 231, at 336.
261. Ryan, supra note 69, at 13 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B) (2012)).
262. Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3308 (2012).
263. The SEC recognizes that the FDCPA limits its ability to collect penalties:
To collect penalties, the Commission is limited to the remedies provided by the Federal
Debt Collection Procedures Act (“FDCPA”) to pursue judgments for penalties. These
include: execution on real property and personalty; writs of garnishment; installment
payment orders; and, in certain circumstances, fraudulent transfer actions, which can
be initiated against debtors who transfer their assets, thereby keeping them out of the
creditor’s reach.
2006 SEC SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 107, at 26 (citations omitted).
264. See id. at 25–26 (noting that “[t]he FDCPA cannot be used to seek recovery of
disgorgement debt” and listing ways that a court could enforce disgorgement under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
265. The SEC has a few options to pursue judgments for disgorgement:
First, the Commission can request the federal court to hold a defendant in civil
contempt for failure to pay the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 70. The Commission
can also request the federal courts to issue “writs of execution” allowing it to “execute
on” real or personal property. An execution is the physical seizure or forced sale of a
defendant’s real or personal property. Finally, the Commission can utilize its
administrative wage garnishment process.
Id. (citations omitted).
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compensation of defrauded investors remains both a sensible and
easily applied course of action for the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Disgorgement, since its inception in Texas Gulf Sulphur, has
undergone perhaps the most extensive doctrinal transformation of any
remedy sought by the SEC. As a form of ancillary equitable relief,
disgorgement was originally intended to supplement the principal
statutory remedy of an injunction. Instead, “[d]isgorgement has
become the routine remedy for a securities enforcement action.”266 The
lack of a statutory basis for disgorgement became a flashpoint after the
Kokesh decision ruled it a penalty for statute of limitations purposes.
The Court’s reasoning could easily be applied to disgorgement at large,
putting the mechanism at existential risk. Disgorgement, as currently
implemented, has been extended to the edge of its power by the SEC,
and has often superseded its equitable mandate by recouping amounts
that exceed the ill-gotten gains of wrongdoers.
Accordingly, the potent tool of disgorgement remains at risk of
being removed entirely from the enforcement arsenal. With its fault
lines exposed after Kokesh, disgorgement should be reined in for a
number of reasons—recent Supreme Court decisions trend toward
repudiating such unbridled governmental power, the SEC has
inequitably enforced disgorgement as a penalty, and the original
rationale for disgorgement is not nearly as persuasive as it once was.
Threatened by the loss of its most favored tool, the SEC should narrow
its use of disgorgement to recovery of nothing more than the amount
illicitly gained by the wrongdoer, and the SEC should use the disgorged
funds to compensate fraud victims. Both of these measures would allow
for disgorgement to return to its remedial—not deterrent—origins,
thus ensuring that the SEC’s use of the enforcement tool avoids the
penalty reasoning of Kokesh. However persuasive the argument
against disgorgement may be, the tool is nonetheless necessary in
federal court because the future of the remedy is uncertain in
administrative proceedings, because it embodies the intuitive notion of
preventing wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongs, and because
it fulfills the need for victim compensation. Ultimately, ensuring
disgorgement’s future as an equitable remedy in federal court means
saving disgorgement from itself.

266. SEC v. Berlacher, No. 07-3800, 2010 WL 3566790, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010).

